Terzet-Digitaal Congres-15-dhr. dr. R. van Es

TERZET 25 JAAR- DIGITAAL CONGRES 2018 3 Table 1 Characteristics of a fitting ethical decision-making model for certified experts A model with these characteristics would be helpful to methodize the debates experts have among themselves on developing their code of conduct. As a result the model could also deliver the format for the mores prudence of the professional associations. In order to develop a model that matches these characteristics we choose our starting point in the theoretical background of ethics as a process. Ethics as a Process: Imaginary Communication In the late 20th century, ethics as a process started to shift away from imaginary communication and toward factual communication. At first, philosophers tried to imagine how a hypothetical discussion of a moral issue could be conducted in a morally sound way. There are three ideas in this line of thought that are still influential today. These are all in the tradition of thinking about justice as concluding a contract (Barry, 1995, Darwall, 2003a). The first two ideas are based on justice as impartiality (Kantian tradition), while the third is based on justice as mutual benefit (Hobbesian tradition). In the first idea, the interlocutors are placed in the original position (Rawls, 1971). In this position, we imagine there is no society yet. So we begin by talking about the organizing principles underlying the society yet to be formed. The interlocutors find themselves behind ‘a veil of ignorance’. This is not the same as Socrates’ ironic ignorance, but is instead the actual ignorance necessary to bring about justice by means of collective decision- making. The interlocutors behind the veil of ignorance do not know what their position in society is going to be; nor do they know whether they are going to be rich or poor, sexy or ugly, smart or dumb. Based on this uncertainty, the interlocutors will choose organizing principles that will create a society where no one fares too badly. No one knows who might get the short end of the stick, so it’s in everyone’s interest to ensure that even those who are worst off can still lead a decent life. In the second influential idea, the interlocutors hold an ideal discussion (Habermas, 1983), in which a special discourse applies. In this discourse, every participant is allowed to take the floor and put forward whatever they like while the interlocutors listen. Every interest at stake is taken equally seriously and is assessed impartially. No differences in power exist in this discourse. Only the power of the best argument counts and this eventually leads the interlocutors to a shared understanding. Based on this, they formulate universally applicable norms. Eight years later Habermas (1991) contended that there are actually two types of discourse. In the discourse of justification, we try to reach a consensus on justice and universal standards. In the discourse of application, we try to apply these standards to practical situations with all of their particularities. The third idea is in line with the idea of justice as mutual benefit. Gauthier (1986) elaborates this as the original negotiating position. Again, it is a matter of selecting the moral principles underlying further action and distribution, but, unlike Rawls’ premise, the interlocutors in the original position know very well what their innate talents and interests are or will be. The only thing they do not know is what their social status is going to be. In addition, they have equal negotiating skills. According to Gauthier, these rational negotiators will base themselves on mutual benefit and therefore keep their promises and focus on the long term. That is the only