Terzet-Digitaal Congres-15-dhr. dr. R. van Es

TERZET 25 JAAR- DIGITAAL CONGRES 2018 4 way to safeguard long-term mutual benefit. Actions based purely on self-interest are fixated on the short term only. To Gauthier, rational choice therefore equals moral choice, albeit in a narrow sense. Hence, the hypothetical negotiators agree on an important limitation: they are not allowed to improve their own situation at the cost of others. This is a rational obligation benefitting cooperation and reconciliation. It ensures that you achieve more collectively than individually. Gauthier anchors his line of reasoning in game theory’s rational negotiators, but ends up feeling compelled to introduce some affective skills. Purely rational negotiators do not get us very far in the domain of ethics. In their own way, Rawls and Habermas each attempt to create a free space for defining justice as impartiality; these are the original position and the ideal discussion situation, respectively. These free spaces are useful thought experiments that attempt to shape justice in an imaginary and interactive way. Habermas concludes that interactions about morals need to be split into two levels. The level of reflection helps us transcend the context, whereas the level of application puts us right in the middle of it. This offers an interesting angle for moving from imaginary communication to factual communication, which also includes negotiation, and connect theory and practice. Ethics as a Process: Factual Communication When we factually discuss moral issues, we always do so in a context: in cultural, political and economic circumstances against the backdrop of a history we share to some extent (Jackson, 2011). This context presents us with limitations, but also opportunities. Gauthier takes a step in the direction of practice when talking about negotiations. Unfortunately, he limits himself to game theory’s rational actors (bargaining) while the concept of negotiation is potentially much more comprehensive (Fisher, Ury and Patton 1991; Van Es, 1996). For example, constructive negotiations can deal with the kind of relationship the stakeholders wish to maintain and the rules they want to abide by when discussing content. In other words, this is meta-level negotiation which will necessarily bring to light possible differences in culture between the interlocutors (Isenhart and Spangle, 2000; Van Es, 2000). This type of negotiation at the level of reflection can be turned into an ethical dialogue. Embedded in this ethical dialogue is an application-level, the moral debate. This is where we confront each other with information and arguments about the ethical issue at stake. Not every discussion about mutual relationships is necessarily an ethical dialogue, however. Likewise, not every form of argumentation about content constitutes a moral debate. To qualify as either, such interlocutions must meet specific conditions and have specific values, that is process values and outcome values. Process Values of the Ethical Dialogue In an ethical dialogue, the interlocutors first distance themselves from the ethical issue. They take a helicopter view, as it were, and so create their own reflective space. The dialogue is the ethical debate’s meta-level. This is where the interlocutors discuss how they relate to each other and how they can cooperate. In other words, this is about how interlocutors see each other and about their pertinent assumptions and convictions. An ethical dialogue hinges on the process value of reciprocity, directly connected to the values respect and trust. The most fundamental value in an ethical dialogue is reciprocity (Mauss, 1966; Ricoeur, 1992; Scanlon, 1998), simply stated as: “I will treat you as an able moral actor and I expect you to treat me as one too, vice versa.” (see Table 2). Power differences in terms of money, possessions and social standing play no part in this respect. This reciprocity is based on an approximate power parity. After all, complete equalization of power differences is hard to attain and control in practice. The key is that the interlocutors are able to conduct an ethical dialogue together. If necessary, interpreters and ethical advocates can eliminate or smooth out power differences. One special aspect of reciprocity is respect. Every moral actor deserves to be treated humanely, at the very least. The other three denotations of respect – performance, position and power – can be discussed during the dialogue (Van Es, 2015). Trust can be interpreted as a reciprocal relationship. In addition to factual criteria such as competence and performance, there are emotional criteria at play; does the other behave decently and transparently, and does the other care about their own honesty? If the answer to these questions is yes, then we are prepared to put our trust in the other. And if this sentiment is reciprocal, there is trust between two moral actors (Luhman, 1988; Lewicki and Bunker, 1996).